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Introduction 
Although tax evasion is a world-wide problem, it appears to be a greater problem in some 
countries than in others. In previous studies the level of evasion has been correlated with a 
number of economic and social variables including taxpayers’ incomes, the perceived tax 
burden (Bawly, 1982; Baldry, 1987); the marginal rate of tax (Myddelton, 1969, p.227); the 
general public perception of the purpose for which the taxes are raised (Cowell and Gordon, 
1987); and the age distribution of the population (Marrelli, 1987, p.220). But a further set 
of factors relate to the efficiency with which the tax authorities combat evasion and thereby 
retain confidence in the tax system. Studies have identified the probability of detection as 
a tax evader, the penalties levied for evasion and the numbers already partaking in the black 
economy as key conditions (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Benjamini and Maital, 1985; 
Cowell, 1987). Therefore, lessons may be learned by studying the way in which evasion is 
, 
tackled in different countries.’ The purpose of this chapter is to look at the methods 
adopted in the UK in the light of estimates of the size of the UK black economy. The 
black economy, alternatively sometimes referred to as the shadow or hidden economy, is 
made up of economic activities in which illegal dodging of tax liabilities occurs. 
In the UK tax administration is divided mainly between two departments of state, the Inland 
Revenue and Customs and Excise. The Inland Revenue administers Income Tax, 
Corporation Tax (on company profits), Capital Gains Tax, petroleum taxation (relating to oil . 
exploration and extraction in the UK and surrounding waters) and Stamp Duties (eg. on land 
transactions). The levying of VAT, tax on gambling and customs and excise duties is the 
responsibility of the Customs and Excise Department. In addition to these two revenue 
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departments, local authorities levy the new “Community Charge” (poll tax) and the 
Department of Social Security is responsible for national insurance contributions.2 National 
insurance contributions began life as payments for state unemployment and sickness benefit 
and pension entitlements, but since the link between payments and receipts is largely broken 
are now in effect a further tax on incomes. For reasons of space, the discussion below is 
largely lim ited to the two taxes considered to involve the most evasion in the UK - Income 
Tax on the self employed and VAT. 
The chapter begins by considering various estimates of the size of the UK’s black economy. 
The structure, management and powers of the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise 
departments are then detailed before the performance of the departments is discussed. 
The Size of the UK Black Economy 
Tax evasion in the UK is as old as taxation itself and certainly pre-dates the high levels of 
taxation imposed since 1945. In the m id-nineteenth century when income tax was low and 
affected relatively few, Parliamentary Select Committees took evidence on the nature of 
evasion; while the Board of Inland Revenue in the 1860s concluded that it had “as usual, 
abundant evidence . ..[of a] . . . . number of fraudulent returns” (Sabine, 1966, p.104). 
We m ight expect, however, that the total amount of tax lost through evasion is related to the 
number of taxpayers and therefore evasion today is both economically more significant and 
widespread than in earlier periods. In the UK the number paying income tax has risen 
appreciably since the Second World War, so that the tax is now paid by most earners. 
There were 3.8m  income taxpayers in 1938/39 and 21.4m  by 1978/79 (Inland Revenue 
Statisrics. 1984, Table 1.3). Also, in the past the prevalence of large firms  in the British 
economy, which are unlikely to participate in flagrant tax evasion, has probably helped to 
depress the size of the black economy. In recent years, however, encouraged by 
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the potential for tax evasion has increased. The number of unincorporated business 
accounts and company accounts received annually by the Inland Revenue increased from 2m 
to 2.25 million and from under 600,000 to nearly 700,000 respectively between 1984/85 and 
1988/89 alone (Inland Revenue, 131st Annual Report, 1989). 
Balanced against these developments, since 1979 marginal rates of tax have been reduced 
thus lowering the gains from evasion especially for the higher paid; though for some on low 
incomes the loss of state welfare benefits combined with income tax still produces effective 
marginal rates of close to 100%. In addition, the introduction of VAT in the UK in 1973, 
replacing Purchase Tax, led to a substantial increase in the number of businesses and 
individuals paying and collecting the tax. In particular, many services became liable to tax 
for the first time and services may be especially prone to evasion, eg. home improvements, 
taxis, etc.. Furthermore, in 1979 the main rate of VAT was raised from 8% to 15%, thus 
increasing the gains from VAT evasion. 
A number of attempts have been made since the 1970s to estimate the extent of the black 
economy in the UK and to assess whether it is growing or diminishing (for summaries see 
eg. Heertje et.al., 1982; Smithies, 1984; Smith, 198 1 and 1986). In 198 1, after a random 
selection of 5,500 self employed files, Inland Revenue Inspectors concluded that at least 20% 
of accounts submitted probably under-revealed the true profits earned. This implies 
widescale evasion by the self-employed. The self-employed, however, are, a group 
especially prone to evading tax and it cannot be deduced from this sample that around one- 
fifth of all taxpayers are necessarily involved in evasion. Companies are subject to 
independent audit in the UK; while employees have tax deducted at source under the PAYE 
system, hence the scope for evasion is dramatically reduced. 
Equally, even if a‘ large percentage of the self-employed evade tax, the total income under- 
declared may be small in relation to GNP. Household spending on those services likely to 
be especially prone to evasion amounts to only abound 2.5% of total household spending. In 
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a stab at estimating the black economy’s size, Sir W illiam  Pyle, Chairman of the Board of the 
Inland Revenue, in March 1979 suggested that it could be equivalent to around 7.5% of 
GNP. This estimate was subsequently repeated by the Association of Her Majesty’s 
Inspectors of Taxes (the main professional body for high level tax officials) and the House 
of Commons Public Accounts Committee. However, its precise basis remains unclear and the 
suspicion remains that it was little more than an “educated guess”; a guess by a Chairman 
anxious to impress Parliament of the need for more resources for the Inland Revenue, while 
wishing to avoid criticism  of the competence of his department (Peacock, 1988). 
Research into the size of the black economy in the UK by economists has suggested 
estimates varying widely from  a low of 2% to a more worrying 15% of GNP. This wide 
range reflects the difficulty in measuring something on which by its very nature information 
is scanty. Also, as B runo S. Frey and Hannelore Week of the University of Zurich (1981) 
have noted, estimates of the size of the black economy are sensitive to the criteria for 
measurement used (also see O’Higgins, 1981; Marrelli, 1987). B roadly, four methods have 
been adopted (for a fuller description of these methods see eg. Pyle, 1989): 
All purchase transactions imply a corresponding economic activity in production. 
Therefore, the amount of cash used in the economy may shed light on the amount of 
evasion. B roadly three approaches have been adopted: (i) this considers that the 
desired currency ratio compared with bank deposits is generally constant so that 
changes in the ratio reflect changes in the size of the black economy; (ii) 
alternatively, and on the prem ise that the black economy is essentially a cash 
economy, an increase in the use of large denomination bank notes is evidence of a 
growing level of tax evasion; and (iii) based on the Quantity Theory of Money, a 
change in the relationship between the cash stock and the total value of recorded 
output may indicate a change in the scale of evasion. . 
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notes and coins. This led Edgar Feige (198 1) to argue that the black economy could 
account for 15Oh of UK GNP, nearly twice as large as Pyle’s “guesstimate”. Feige 
also claimed that the black economy had probably grown rapidly in the first half of 
the 197Os, peaking in 1974. Studies by Bhattacharyya et. al. (1986) and Matthews and 
Rastogi (1985) have also reported evidence of a large black economy. 
Bhattacharyya’s estimate based on cash transactions suggests a black economy of up 
to 10.6% of GNP; while Matthews and Rastogi, analysing monetary trends alongside 
factors likely to affect the demand for real currency holdings, put the figure nearer 
Feige’s estimate, at up to 14.5% of GDP. 
There are, however, major problems with the whole monetary approach to estimating 
the scale of tax evasion. In particular, it assumes that, leaving aside any growth in 
the black economy, there is a fairly stable relationship between the cash stock and 
recorded output. In fact, changes in the financial system in the UK, including from 
the 1960s a substantial rise in the use of non-cash transactions with the spread of 
bank accounts, credit cards and other financial instruments, probably largely accounts 
for cash financing a falling share of economic transactions. Moreover, there is no 
evidence that the black economy is limited to cash transactions; a significant part 
may, for instance, involve barter trade. Estimating techniques have been refined to 
take account of such problems, but they continue to complicate estimation of the size 
of the black economy by this method (Kay and King, 1990, p.57; Smith, 1986, 
p.108). 
An alternative broad approach to estimating the size of the black economy involves 
comparing income and expenditure based estimates of national income. These 
should be identical since they are measuring the same flow of income around the 
economy. Where recorded national expenditure considerably exceeds national 
income this might reflect under-declared incomes, 
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(3) 
Adopting this approach, Kerrick Macafee (1980) of the Government’s Central 
Statistical Office estimated that tax evasion in the UK amounted to around 3.5% of 
GNP and three-quarters of this was probably accounted for by evasion amongst the 
self employed. Macafee concluded that whilst there was some evidence that tax 
evasion was on the increase in the UK, the rise was probably not dramatic. 
O’Higgins (1980) has come to a similar conclusion. 
However, the income and expenditure method has well-known defects. Activities in 
the black economy may deflate both income and recorded expenditure figures, 
notably through under-revealment of sales of goods and services subject to VAT. 
Hence, comparing expenditure and income figures involves comparing two sets of 
defective estimates. Moreover, the gap between national expenditure and income 
figures in the late 197Os, which formed the basis for Macfee’s estimates, has been 
largely eliminated since by statistical revisions. 
Another method, now more widely favoured, involves measuring the black economy 
using data collected by government surveys, notably the Family Expenditure Survey, 
or by direct questioning of those sections of the population most likely to be 
involved in tax evasion. However, like the other approaches to black economy 
estimation it is not without its problems. Notably the Family Expenditure Survey 
may not accurately reflect spending patterns, while questionnaire based procedures 
are subject to all the usual questionnaire biases. Tax evaders may be reluctant to 
reveal their activities to researchers, despite assurances that the information will 
remain confidential. 
A survey by Brown, Levin, Rosa and Ulph (1984), using Treasury data on “second 
jobs”, where evasion might be expected to be prevalent, concluded that about 5% of 
workers in Britain held two or more jobs and that the income tax lost from “second 
job” tax evasion probably amounted to around 1.1% of income tax receipts or 0.3% of 
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national income. The total tax evaded in the UK may be considerably higher, 
however, because of inaccurate responses to the questionnaire from which the data 
were derived. Also, the study excludes evasion by persons having only one job 
(which includes large numbers of the self employed), Capital Gains Tax and VAT 
evasion, and evasion of tax by companies. 
Another and more recent study has attempted to compare the consumption patterns 
of employee and self-employed households at different income levels using 
government data. Figures on household spending by different groups in society 
were compared with recorded incomes for these groups. In effect, this meant 
estimating two consumption functions - one for employees the other for the self 
employed. The employee function was assumed to reflect the true income and 
differences between employee and self employed patterns of spending were taken to 
reflect under-declared income. The extent of income concealed by the self 
employed was found to be between loo/6 and 20%, producing an estimate of evasion 
of up to 5% of GNP (Smith, 1986, p.152). 
Two further studies, based upon income and expenditure data drawn from Family 
Expenditure Survey data, also provided modest estimates of the size of the Black 
economy. Dilnot and Morris (1981) concluded that evasion possibly amounted to as 
little as 2.5Oh to 3% of national income; while Pissarides and Weber (1989) found “that 
on average true self-employment income is 1.5 times as much as reported self- 
employment income.” At that time, self employment accounted for around 10% of 
employment and national income. This implied that the size of the black economy 
was about 5 per cent of GDP. This approach to estimating the size of the black 
economy assumes that employees do report their incomes correctly. 
(4) Finally, a fourth broad method of estimation, pioneered by Frey and Week (1983), 
involves “soft modelling” of the black economy. In this case, the size of tax evasion 
is related to a number of explanatory variables. Like all econometric estimation, 
however, the results are sensitive to the model specification, assumptions made about 
the size of the relative coefficients and data availability (Marrelli, 1987, p.212). 
To date the emphasis in soft modelling has been on providing international rank 
orderings of the likelihood of high levels of evasion. The most noteworthy study is 
the analysis of OECD countries, including the UK, by Week-Hannemen and Frey 
(1985). Isolating six explanatory variables affecting the level of tax evasion - tax 
immorality, tax burden, regulatory burden, labour force participation rate, working 
hours, and foreign workers as a share of the labour force - they estimated evasion in 
the UK in 1978 at around 8% of GNP. 
(Table 1 around here.) 
Table 1 summarises the results from the above studies. The monetary approach to 
estimating the size of the black economy is responsible for the largest estimates. But at the 
same time this approach looks to be the most suspect. Therefore the high estimates of up 
to 15% of GNP can probably be discounted. The other approaches tend to suggest a figure 
, 
of up to 8O/b, which is, interestingly, not so different’to the Inland Revenue’s widely quoted 
“guesstimate” of 7.5%. The lower range estimates, which appear to be the more reliable 
ones, imply that tax evasion in the UK is not excessive, especially when compared with 
estimates of evasion from other countries (cf. Frey and Week, 1983). This might be 
interpreted, at least in part, as a sign that the tax authorities in the UK have been successful 
in suppressing evasion. However, what is unclear from such studies, usually based on one 
year’s data, is whether the black economy is expanding, static or declining. Clearly much 
more research is needed into trends in the UK black economy before we can be certain. 
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Organisation and Powers of the Inland Revenue 
The structure of the Inland Revenue varied little from the First World War down to the 
1970s and this structure has left its hallmark on the department today. This is evident in 
the degree of autonomy given to local offices and the separation of the department into two 
halves. These comprise the &spectorate of Taxes responsible for assessing tax liabilities and 
the Collector of Taxes responsible for collecting the tax assessed.’ In 1975 a Review 
Committee (Inland Revenue, 1975) advocated major changes in organisation to improve the 
department’s attack on evasion and these were subsequently introduced. Figure 1 is a 
current organisation chart provided by the Inland Revenue. 
(Figure 1 around here.) 
The structure is portrayed by the department as a wheel and spoke organisation but infact it 
is essentially hierarchical with the Chairman of the Board of the Inland Revenue at its head. 
This reflects the need for political accountability and to ensure that tax administration is 
standardised across the country. Nevertheless, in the 1980s there has been an attempt to 
introduce more local management responsibility to improve efficiency. To this end the 
department has introduced new management information systems and in 1987/88 a new line- 
management budgeting system was implemented. Local managers, known as District 
Inspectors, are now responsible for running their own budgets and deploying resources 
within those budgets. At the same time, the department has become more accountable for 
the quality of its work and its costs. Hence, the department has begun to publish 
Departmental Statements and Management Plans. These detail workloads and costs over a 
three year period and are designed to help decide objectives, strategies and targets. A 
further contributory factor in raising efficiency and changing the organisation of work in 
the Inland Revenue recently has been the rapid pace of computerisation, albeit after years of 
delay. Between 1984/85 and 1988/89 the number of cemputer terminals in local tax offices I 
increased from zero to 38,000 (Inland Revenue, 131sf Annual Report. 1989, p.22). In 1990 a 
new computerised collection scheme will be implemented and an on-line Corporation Tax 
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system should be in place by 1993. 
The Board of the Inland Revenue (known formally as the Commissioners of the Inland 
Revenue) is responsible to the Treasury and ultimately to the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
for the operation of the department. At the head office level, specialist work and 
management is undertaken through numerous “Technical and Management Divisions”, while a 
policy division based in the Treasury provides advice to government on new legislation and 
the impact of tax changes. 
Below head office, there are 15 regions covering the UK, each headed by a senior inspector 
known as a Regional Controller. Each Regional Controller is responsible through a number 
of Group Controllers for the tax districts in his region. To achieve economies the number 
of tax offices has been reduced from over 750 to 629 since the early 198Os, but the number 
of staff in each office and at different grades has in general varied very little. The 
exception is a reduction in the number of junior clerical staff (now called Revenue 
Assistants) which results from a movement away from paper records (see Table 2). 
(Table 2 around here.) 
4 Each tax district is headed by a District Inspector, assisted by a small number of inspectors, 
usually around 7 (the organisation of a typical tax office is detailed in Figure 2). Of these 
typically 3 will be inspectors, often graduates, who have received an intensive and 
demanding three year training in tax law and practice and accountancy, including aceunts 
investigation. They deal primarily with large business and company accounts. The 
remainder of the inspectors who do not have this level of expertise tackle evasion in small 
businesses where complex legal and accounting problems are rare. 
. 
(Figure 2 around here.) 
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These are headed by Revenue Executives, who manage sections of the office or undertake 
higher level clerical duties (eg. PAYE compliance by directors of companies). Underneath 
them come the Revenue Officers and Revenue Assistants who handle day to day routine 
administration. In the early 198Os, after a successful experiment, it was decided to appoint 
730 higher grade tax officers and 120 inspectors across the country based in tax offices to 
trace “moonlighters” and “ghosts” (people unknown to the tax authorities) by following up 
anonymous letters and perusing the local newspapers, telephone directories and trade 
directories etc. However, due to staff shortages this target has not been met. Throughout 
the 1980s the department, like other areas of the civil service, has been under continuous 
pressure to reduce staffing levels. The number of employees, rising steadily until the late 
197Os, has since declined by 22% (see Table 3). 
(Table 3 around here.) 
In addition to the District Offices, Special Offices and Enquiry Branch handle the more 
complex and larger evasion cases, especially those which can be best tackled centrally rather 
than at local level. These offices inititate their own investigations as well as receiving cases 
referred up from the District level. Enquiry Branch deals with all cases where fraud or the 
honesty and competence of accountants is suspected. District Offices are nor permitted to 
handle fraud cases as they require special legal knowledge. There are 10 Enquiry Branch 
offices spread across the UK and because of their complexity investigations last on average 
for two to three years, although sometimes far longer. Special Offices are newer and were 
established from the mid-1970s when it became apparent that some investigations overlapped 
district boundaries and were best handled centrally. There were 4 to 5 Special Offices in 
1980 and 10 by 1986. They have proved particularly successful. The tax yield by Special 
Offices from investigations rose from f’20Sm in 1980 to over f 1OOm by 1985. Like Enquiry. 
Branch, they are staffed largely with inspectors or accountants and both the Special Offices 
and Enquiry Branch are currently developing computerised data banks to assist their 
investigations (Halpern, 1990). 
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A further specialist unit of the Inland Revenue is PAYE Audit, which is integrated into the 
Collection branch of the department. It is staffed by auditors with support staff. Their 
primary role is to check compliance with income tax PAYE regulations and the 
subcontractors special deduction scheme for the construction industry.4 They are the only 
part of the Revenue which systematically visits business premises and checks books and 
records. They made 69,000 visits in 1987/88 and in over 40% of inspections unearthed 
some irregularities (Inland Revenue, 123rd Annual Report, 198 1, p.18). A common failure 
involves the non-deduction of PAYE tax by directors. The discovery of failures to deduct 
tax on the payment of emoluments to directors yielded f 183m in 1986. Where there is a 
suggestion of wider evasion or poor business records, then the local district tax office will be 
advised so that a fuller investigation can be mounted. 
. 
In addition to the above sections, the department contains a number of small specialist 
investigation units which work independently or in conjunction with tax offices. One such 
unit is the Special Trades Investigation Unit set up in 1986 to combat tax losses arising from 
the closing down of companies in the textile industry owing large amounts of back tax. 
The directors of such companies would then move on and set up further companies 
undertaking the same work but freed of tax debts (a process known as “Pheonixation”). 
Further specialist units worth noting are Special Investigations Section, which deals with 
complex tax avoidance cases, and Investigation Office, which is part of Collection. 
Investigation Office pursues suspected cases of fraudulent claims, usually involving personal 
allowances against tax, inflated expenses and the misuse of subcontractors certificates under 
the subcontractor tax scheme. 90% of their investigations lead to prosecution and conviction 
(Sabine, 1986). 
Since most tax investigations occur at the local tax office level, the following discussion 
centres upon *their methods. In 1976 the Inland Revenue introduced a radically new 
approach to tackling tax evasion by businesses and companies with the objective of raising 
13 
sometimes briefly and enquiries were made affecting around 300/b of them. Sometimes the 
enquiries related to trifling sums of business expenses. Fuller investigations, known as 
“back duty” cases, only took place where there were appropriate grounds, eg. an informant’s 
letter or an unexplained build up of private capital. 
By the mid-1970s there was growing public and parliamentary concern about what was 
popularly perceived to be a growing black economy problem in the UK, yet the amount of 
tax recovered by Inland Revenue investigators had fallen appreciably in real terms from the 
mid- 1960~~. With the aim of raising efficiency, in 1976 a new and more selective method 
of choosing cases for investigation was instituted. This led to fewer accounts being 
challenged but each investigation was to be conducted in more depth. Since that date, 
accounts received in tax offices are initially screened quickly by a senior inspector who gives 
each account one of three possible classifications. Those accounts accepted without query 
are marked “A”, which stands for “accept”; those which have obvious computational or other 
errors which require limited correspondence on specific points are marked “R”, meaning 
“review technical points”; while a small percentage are taken up for full enquiry with a view 
to unearthing evasion and are marked “E”, which indicates “examine in depth”. “A” 
accounts are passed to clerical staff for assessments to be issued based on the taxpayers’ 
figures. “R” and “E” accounts are allocated to inspectors. The method is known within the 
Revenue as the “ERA system” (Bingham, 1980; Reader, 198 1). 
To help identify potential investigation (ie. “E”) cases and to assist in the most efficient use 
of the department’s limited inspector resources, each tax district has an Investigation Plan. 
The Plan will normally include: 
& 
(a> a profile of the types of businesses dealt with in the district; . 
(b) comparative reviews of business results within similar trades; 
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(cl a  list o f co rpora t ion  tax  a c c o u n ts fo r  c o m p a n i e s  w h e r e  th e  bas ic  accuracy  o f th e  
a c c o u n ts m a y  b e  w r o n g  or,  in  th e  case  o f la rger  bus inesses  w h e r e  th e  tax  c o m p u te d  
war ran ts  check ing ;  
(4  i n fo rmat ion  f rom o the r  sou rces  ind ica t ing  evas ion ;  
(d  o the r  in fo rmat ion  l ead ing  to  th e  d e tec t ion  o f “b lack  e c o n o m y ” bus inesses  ( L u n d b e r g , 
1 9 8 9 ) . 
T h e  d e p a r tm e n t h a s  g i ven  r e p e a te d  assu rances  to  th e  pr ivate  sector  th a t its o ff icers a re  n o t 
permi t ted  to  in i t iate enqu i r y  cases  a t r a n d o m  b u t on ly  w h e r e  th e r e  is g o o d  c a u s e . A lso, 
desp i te  th e  o n s e t o f c o m p u ter isat ion,  th e  d e p a r tm e n t a p p e a r s  to  h a v e  n o  p lans  to  in t roduce  
c o m p u te r i sed  se lec t ion  o f invest igat ion cases.  Th is  invo lves  i d e n t i fy ing var iab les  wh i ch  a re  
l ikely to  ind ica te  a  h i g h  r isk o f evas ion ,  a n d  is u s e d  in  th e  U S A , D e n m a r k , Ita ly  a n d  France.  
Ins tead  th e  cr i ter ia fo r  se lec t ion  o f a c c o u n ts fo r  invest igat ion s h o u l d  fa l l  w i th in  th e  te r m s  o f 
a  1 9 7 7  a g r e e m e n t b e tween  th e  In l a n d  R e v e n u e  a n d  th e  Consu l ta t ive  C o m m i tte e  o f 
A c c o u n tin g  B o d i e s  (Cunl i f fe,  1 9 9 0 ) . Th is  sets o u t a  code- -o f  c o n d u c t fo r  invest igat ions 
wh i ch  states th a t th e  inspector  m u s t h a v e  g o o d  g r o u n d s  fo r  suspec t ing  evas ion  b e fo re  a n  
enqu i r y  beg ins .  
T h e  c h a n g e  in  th e  d e p a r tm e n t’s a p p r o a c h  to  se lec t ing  cases  fo r  invest igat ion in  1 9 7 6  a lso  
invo lved  a  c h a n g e  th e  m e th o d  o f invest igat ion.  Tradi t ional ly ,  invest igat ions w e r e  b a s e d  o n  
enqu i r i es  in to th e  bus iness  propr ie tor’s pe rsona l  e x p e n d i tu res  aga ins t  dec la red  incomes .  
U n e x p l a i n e d  capi ta l  accre t ions  w e r e  th e n  d e e m e d  to  b e  a  p r o d u c t o f i n c o m e  wh ich  h a d  
e v a d e d  tax  (a  m e th o d  k n o w n  as  capi ta l  s ta tements  a n d  wh i ch  is stil l u s e d  ex tens ive ly  wi th in  
Enqu i r y  B ranch  w h e n  a tte m p tin g  to  o b ta in  suff ic ient e v i d e n c e  to  p rosecu te  fo r  f raud).  In  
tax  distr icts th e  m e th o d  h a s  sw i tched to w a r d s  a n  ana lys is  o f th e  bus iness  records  wi th a  v iew 
to  d iscover ing  er rors  a n d  incons is tenc ies  a n d , o n c e  d iscovered ,  r e c o m p u tin g  prof i ts b a s e d  
15 
“business economics” (Reader, 1981: Sabine, 1986). This has meant that since the mid- 1970s 
Inspectors have had to be trained much more thoroughly than previously in accounting and 
. the examination of business records. 
In general an. jnvestigation will tend to involve one or more of the following a,pproaches to 
discrediting records and recomputing profits: 
rf 
n cash flow tests on the business records; 
n the reconstruction of the accounts based on standard gross profit rates for the trade; 
n access to bank account statements and documents relating to other investments to 
check on capital accretions; 
n means tests (and still on occasions capital statements) which balance incomes against 
expenditures. 
x 
low profits or turnover compared with similar businesses; 
the relationship between sales and purchases; 
an unexplained fall in profits; 
businesses where there is a predominance of cash receipts (eg. public houses, taxis); 
accounts drawn up by poor quality, often unqualified, accountants; 
information from PAYE audit or Customs and Excise of accounting irregularities; 
low drawings by proprietors or low salaries of directors; 
information from informants or from banks regarding &declared bank interest; 
n low gross profit. rates compared with similar businesses. 
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Where returns are not made or the Inspector is not satisfied that the return is correct and 
complete, the Inland Revenue issues estimated assessments, 
that is assessments of tax 
liabilities based upon the inspector’s estimate of the likely profits made. 
These are likely to 
be well in excess of what the taxpayer states were earned. 
The issuing of estimated 
assessments is the Inland Revenue’s means of ensuring that a taxpayer co-operates with their 
enquiries. The taxpayer can appeal against the assessments to an independent tribunal 
known as the General or Special Commissioners.6 
But before these Commissioners the 
major onus is on the taxpayer to show that the assessments are excessive rather than on the 
inspector to show that his estimate of profits is reasonable. 
In 1987/88 3744 appeals were 
received against assessments, but the vast majority were settled by prior agreement with the 
local inspector and hence without recourse to the Commissioners. 
An investigation normally involves the inspector seeing the books and records of the 
business, investigation of personal tax returns and interviews with the taxpayer (and his 
accountant where relevant) (Sabine, 1989). Although traders and companies are expected to 
submit accounts each year in support of their tax returns, there is no statutory requirement 
to this effect.7 Also, there is no legal requirement under UK income and corporation tax 
legislation to keep books and records. Failure to do SQ, however, will prevent accountants 
from  preparing proper accounts and will provide the ’ 
that the accounts are wholly unreliable. 
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Where returns are not made or the Inspector is not satisfied that the return is correct and 
complete, the Inland Revenue issues estimated assessments,  that is assessments of tax 
liabilities based upon the inspector’s estimate of the likely profits made.  These are likely to 
be well in excess of what the taxpayer states were earned. The issuing of est imated 
assessments is the Inland Revenue’s means of ensuring that a  taxpayer co-operates with their 
enquiries. The taxpayer can appeal  against the assessments to an independent tribunal 
known as the General or Special Commissioners.6 But before these Commissioners the 
major onus is on the taxpayer to show that the assessments are excessive rather than on the 
inspector to show that his estimate of profits is reasonable. In 1987/88 3744 appeals were 
received against assessments,  but the vast majority were settled by prior agreement with the 
local inspector and hence without recourse to the Commissioners. 
An investigation normally involves the inspector seeing the books and records of the 
business, investigation of personal tax returns and interviews with the taxpayer (and his 
accountant where relevant) (Sabine, 1989). Although traders and companies are expected to 
submit accounts each year in support of their tax returns, there is no statutory requirement 
to this effect.’ Also, there is no legal requirement under UK income and corporation tax 
legislation to keep books and records. Failure to do so, however, will prevent accountants 
from preparing proper accounts and will provide the inspector with ammunit ion to argue 
that the accounts are wholly unreliable. In 1955 the Royal Commission on the Taxation 01 
Profits and Income (Cmnd. 9474) recommended that a  statutory obligation be introduced 
regarding record keeping but this was not pursued. 
The taxpayer is not normally obl iged to provide the inspector with access to his records or tc 
allow him to visit the trade premises to inspect the business. However, failure to co 
operate inevitably leads to a  Commissioners’ hearing where the Commissioners can order t’ 
production of accounts together with support ing books, documents etc and the inspector n  
take copies. Prior to 1976 the Inland Revenue could only call for a  taxpayer’s hoi 
fraud or wilful default (intentional failure to comply with the tax legislation). Since sight 
of such documentation was usually necessary to substantiate a tax offence, the Revenue was 
seriously hampered. 
More widesweeping powers were introduced in 1976 to support the department’s new drive 
against evasion based on the “ERA system”. District Inspectors and other senior Inland 
Revenue officials could now order the production of accounts and certain other business 
records, with major restrictions relating only to access to accountants’ working papers and - 
the records of solicitors and barristers (Jeffery, 1989). #Other powers introduced in 1976 - 
included the right to search premises and seize documents in cases where fraud was .- 
suspected (but subject to the consent of a Circuit Judge). In the first six years of the 
power’s existence, only 83 search warrants were obtained in respect of 15 cases, which 
reflects the assurances given to Parliament that searches would be confined to the most 
serious cases of suspected evasion (Drummond, 1988). This did not prevent, however, 
considerable adverse publicity about Revenue methods when the Revenue raided the offices 
of Rossminster, an organisation associated with marketing what the Revenue judged to be 
artificial tax avoidance schemes (Gillard, 1987). 
n investigation is completed with the signing by the taxpayer of a Statement of Assets, 
etailing the taxpayer’s assets, and a Certificate of Full Disclosure, which confirms that the 
xpayer has fully revealed to the inspector all matters relevant to his tax affairs. The 
axpayer is warned of the serious consequences (potential fraud) of signing these documents 
‘while concealing relevant income or assets (the department tends to prosecute where major 
ources of undeclared income are subsequently discovered). The taxpayer is then required 
0 make an offer in settlement to cover tax, interest and penalties. This “offer” (normally 
arrived at after discussion with the inspector) is then agreed by Technical Division 
(Penalties) at head office, thus broadly standardising across the country the penalties charged 
&y local offices. 
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Until October 1988 the Board of the Inland Revenue set targets for investigation work in 
local offices based mainly on the number of investigations in relation to accounts received. 
Also, inspectors were subject to a “scoring” system based largely on the number of cases 
completed. This, not surprisingly, led to a tendency in local tax offices to concentrate upon 
completing as many investigation cases as quickly as possible. Longer and more complex 
enquiries, but perhaps enquiries that would eventually unearth major evasion, tended to be 
neglected. In October 1988 a new system for business accounts was introduced to give 
greater recognition to the quality of the investigation and the time required to undertake it. 
Under the new Accounts Investigation Monitoring System (AIMS) offices and staff are 
assessed by points awarded which reflect not only the number of cases completed but also 
the type of settlement achieved, the complexity of the investigation and the manner in 
which the case was conducted. The aggregate points from all settlements in relation to 
resources are used to gauge the overall efficiency of the department’s investigation effort 
and as performance targets for District Inspectors (Inland Revenue, 13Zst Annual Report 
1989, p.46). Similar performance indicators have also been developed for Enquiry Branch 
and the Special Offices. 
Following th_c,&ossminster case there was considerable concern voiced in Parliament about - 
the methods used by the Inland Revenue in pursuing tax evaders. _--. In response, the 
Conservative Party in 1979 gave a commitment to instigate a thorough review of powers 
when elected to Government. The product was the setting up of a committee under the 
chairmanship of Lord Keith of Kinkel in 1980 to review the revenue departments’ 
enforcement powers. In March 1983 the Committee reported (Committee on Enforcement 
Powers of the Revenue Departments, Cmnd.8822, March 1983) and many of the 
recommendations were subsequently implemented. A main result of the Committee’s 
deliberations was a major revision of penalty provisions for tax offences. 8 
Revised Inland Revenue- penalties were introduced in 1989 and led to a significant increase 
in tk‘3 nann1t.r eh.n*nPc nc....a,.;oll., tknen ..,h.;,.h ho,-4 hnnn ~w4nA T\.IPI th.p .IP~FC k.r thn affnrrt 
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of inflation. The nsmlty. charges- are summarised in Figure 3 and can be broadly 
divided into three groups: 
8 tax-geared penalties of up to lOOO/b of tax evaded for offences that put tax seriously 
at risk - eg. omissions from tax returns and long delays in completing tax returns; 
8 fixed limit penalties of up to f3000 for each offence relating to the submission of 
certain incorrect returns- eg. returns of directors’ benefits; 
8 fixed penalties for delay in making returns of f300 for the initial offence and f60 
per day thereafter. 
(Figure 3 around here.) 
In all of these cases the penalty charge is mitigated where the taxpayer cooperates with the 
tax enquiry, makes a full confession or the offence is deemed to be minor, eg. small 
amounts of tax were involved. This means that in practice, normally penalties of 20 to 40% 
are charged in tax office investigations. Indeed, a greater financial burden is often placed 
on evaders by the interest charge levied on the tax evaded and paid at the end of the 
investigation. This default interest is in addition to any penalty payments and is calculated 
from the time the tax would have been paid had there been no offence to the investigation 
settlement date. The interest rate charged reflects current interest rates in the economy and 
therefore is revised frequently. It is also worth noting that inspectors can levy interest and 
penalties and recover tax evaded over the previous 20 years in serious cases. In other cases, 
investigations are normally limited to discovering evasion within the previous 6 years. 
Rarely does the Inland Revenue resort to the criminal prosecution of tax evaders. Instead, 
the department preferes to reach a negotiated settlement with the taxpayer which includes 
recovery of tax lost along with mitigated penalties and the interest charge (Cunliffe, 1990). 
..’ .: I _. ..I I_- _‘,’ . ..-..,,, ‘..~...;i-;;,;,~I;~r:.-.~ *+...:-,, c..:.:; .; .-. _ ‘:..- .: . . ‘,. ., .-_. 
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Criminal prosecution tends to occur only where there has been serious fraud often involving 
theft of monies from the Revenue (eg false claims for repayment of tax), where accountants 
are involved in promoting evasion or where there is dishonesty by Revenue officials (see 
Table 4). Following the reforms introduced in 1989, tax misdemeanours are classed as 
“fraudulent or negligent conduct”. It is unusual, however, for tax offenders to be accused 
of the criminal offence of fraud during an investigation. Fraud involves alteration or 
falsification of documents with the intention to deceive and requires a high degree of proof 
if prosecutions are to succeed in court. In contrast, negligence is merely carelessness beyond 
what could be expected of a reasonable person in the conduct of his tax affairs. It simply 
implies a want of care and attention. All evaders successfully investigated by local tax 
offices are accused of negligence. Fraud cases are dealt with by specialist units, notably 
Enquiry Branch and the Special Investigations Section. . _ 
(Table 4 around here.) 
Organisation and Powers of the Customs and Excise 
Today VAT accounts for around 57% of the revenue collected by the Customs and Excise 
, 
who are also responsible for collecting excise duties and gaming taxes and preventing drug 
and other smuggling. The organisation of the Customs and Excise department is 
summarised in Figure 4. A regional structure exists for VAT with 19 collection’ areas in the 
UK and headquarters in Southend, Liverpool and London. Evasion of VAT is tackled by 
local VAT offices and in more serious cases by the Customs and Excise Investigation 
Division. About 12,500 Customs and Excise staff are involved in VAT work and 
approximately 8,200 of these are located in 87 local VAT offices. At a time of staff 
cutbacks their workload has continued to increase. Between March 1980 and March ‘1989 
the number of persons registered for VAT in the UK rose from 1,196,7900 to 1,623,866. 
Consequently, while in 1982/83 the department handled 6,085,OOO VAT returns by 1988/89 
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worrying loss of staff especially to private accounting firms where morale and pay levels are 
superior. Only better management and hard work by remaining staff has enabled 
investigation yields to continue to rise 
(Figure 4 around here.) 
The department publishes a Management Plan at the start of each financial year which is 
agreed with the Treasury. It sets out the department’s priorities, principles and objectives. 
Also, and as in the case of the Inland Revenue, in recent years the department has 
implemented new planning, accounting and budgetary processes and new management 
information systems. Such reforms have been geared to improving the cost effectiveness of 
VAT collection. 
VAT was introduced in the UK in 1973 and is a self assessed tax. Every registered trader, 
which is anyone who is in business in the UK (unless trading in one of a small number of 
exempted categories eg. finance) and with a turnover in excess of f25,400 in 1990/91, must . 
make regular (usually quarterly) returns to the VAT authorities. These returns detail the 
VAT the trader has paid on inputs purchased (input tax) and the VAT charged on goods and 
services sold (output tax). The trader then pays the net VAT charged over to the Customs 
and Excise or, where the input tax exceeds the output tax, receives a VAT repayment of the 
net amount. 
The basis on which these returns are prepared and consequently their reliability is then 
periodically checked by the Customs and Excise, principally through what are called control 
visits. Where the Customs and Excise challenge returns they may issue estimated VAT 
assessments. Appeals against VAT assessments are considered by VAT Tribunals where the 
onus, once again, is on the taxpayer to prove that the tax assessment is excessive. There is 
then a possibility of a further appeal to the courts on a point of law. - However, as in the . 
case of Inland Revenue investigations, Customs and Excise prefer to achieve an agreement 
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with taxpayers without recourse to the tribunals or courts. For example, in 1988/89 there 
were 2954 appeals of which nearly one-half were withdrawn before the tribunal hearing 
occurred. 0 
The amount of tax revenue lost through VAT evasion is reckoned by many economists to be 
comparatively small compared with the sums lost through income tax evasion. Large 
companies undertake the bulk of economic transactions by value and their managements are 
unlikely to -risk evading VAT, especially since they would be unlikely to benefit directly. 
Smaller businesses where evasion might be expected to be a much greater problem will often 
be below the VAT threshold for registration. Hence, the moonlighting joiner who 
undertakes minor house repairs for cash may not be obliged to levy VAT. Also, businesses 
evading tax will be limited in the input tax they can reclaim thus reducing the financial gain 
from evasion and hence the incentive to evade VAT. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to 
be too complacent about compliance with VAT legislation in the UK given the sums 
recovered by VAT investigators annually. 
Central to Customs and Excise policing of VAT is the control visit. Indeed, control visits 
absorb around a half of all local VAT office manpower. During a control visit a VAT 
officer attends the business premises and inspects the books and records of the business to 
ensure that VAT is being correctly recorded for all transactions. Initially it was intended 
that most traders would receive a control visit around every three years. In fact, the 
frequency has been much lower, partly because of staff shortages and partly because the 
department quickly realised that the yield from VAT investigations would be best maximised 
by concentrating resources where evasion was most suspected. The department’s aim has 
been to maximise cost effectiveness by allocating time to those trades and tradets identified 
to be most prone to evasion (H.M. Treasury Working Papers, 1986 and 1987). 
Since 1978 the department has used operational research techniques to identify such trades 
and thus to regulate the frequency of control visits and the length of time spent on each 
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visit (usually between a half a day and three days). Those trading where tax is considered 
to be most at risk can expect to be visited annually. Identification of such trades is based 
upon certain characteristics, such as the type of trade and the amount of turnover, with 
information drawn from a data bank built up by Customs and Excise. 
The introduction of selectivity led to a marked increase in yields from control visits. The 
average underdeclaration of tax discovered per visit rose from f 152 in 1978/79 to over 
f 1000 by the mid-1980s (Smith, 1986, p.59). In 1988 the system was upgraded with the 
introduction of the VAT Operational Planning System (VAVOPS) in a further effort to 
improve the effectiveness of selecting businesses for visits and to measure performance more 
accurately. 
Performance targets arising out of the selectivity system have been introduced at the local 
level to stimulate management. These targets are based upon the actual time available for 
visits given staffing levels. Since the notional times are set with regard to likely revenue at 
risk, they are geared to achieve optimum cost effectiveness with a view to improved 
cost/yield ratios. This approach to measuring and monitoring the use of the department’s 
scarce resources is complemented by further performance indicators, such as additional tax 
discovered per control visit. Using these measures the performance of local VAT offices is 
monitored and action taken to revise or review targets as necessary or to adjust staffing 
levels. The department calculates that the use of key output and performance indicators as 
part of the department’s planning system produced f 16m in additional VAT in 1985/86. 
Moreover, a global yield target is applied at the national level to assess whether the 
department’s total resources are being used in their most effective manner. National targets 
(though not local targets) are sometimes published. In 1988/89, for example, the 
department’s Management Plan required unit costs to be reduced and an extra f700m to be 
discovered during control visits (a rise of 15% in real terms). The department actually 
outperformed this figure, achieving an extra f750m in revenue. 
-;. 
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Turning to the powers of Customs and Excise officers in the collection of VAT, these are 
more extensive than those available to inspectors in the Inland Revenue and this may 
account for a general perception that their approach to investigations is less “gentlemanly” 
(Kelsey, 1987). Besides the right to enter business prem ises regularly during control visits 
and inspect records, VAT law lays down the records traders must keep to ensure an accurate 
recording of input and output tax (in contrast, and as already noted, there is no legislative 
requirement relating to business records for income tax purposes). Customs and Excise can 
also at any other reasonable time enter prem ises and inspect (though not search), request the 
production of records, remove documents from  traders’ prem ises, question customers with a 
view to identifying evaded VAT and inspect certain accountants’ (but not solicitors’) papers. 
Officers can also obtain search warrants from  a magistrate where fraud is suspected and like 
their Inland Revenue colleagues have power of arrest for fraud. However, such powers are 
used only at the discretion of senior officers. 
Assessments to VAT can be made for up to 20 years where civil or crim inal fraud occurs 
but otherwise they must be made within 6 years of the end of the appropriate V.AT return 
period. When VAT was introduced there were few enforcement powers other than the 
costly procedure of adopting crim inal proceedings. Reaching the level of proof for crim inal 
proceedings proved to be a protracted affair and thus investigations were rarely cost 
effective. Also, there were no interest charges for late payment of VAT due. Not 
surprisingly, this state of affairs led to underdeclarations of tax of up to f600m  per annum, 
5m late VAT returns each year and constant arrears of tax totalling around f 1200m. (Jordan, 
1989). To remedy this, the Keith Committee recommended the introduction of penalties 
for serious m isdeclarations and interest charges for default. 
Consequently, extensive new powers were introduced by the 1985 Finance Act and phased in 
over the following 5 years (in addition, powers to prosecute in very serious cases of crim inal 
1 
fraud remain; the maximum sentence is 7 years imprisonment). These new powers allow 
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is evidence of dishonesty. Also, there are now automatic penalties for the late submission 
of VAT returns, late registration and unauthorised issue of VAT invoices or breaches of 
other VAT regulations, for errors in returns which fall short of criminal fraud and for 
persistent understatement of VAT liabilities. Moreover, interest is now chargeable on VAT 
evaded or paid late. The various classes of offence and the related penalties are 
summarised in Figure 5. 
(Figure 5 here.) 
In the vast majority of cases Customs and Excise officers, like their Inland Revenue 
counterparts, finalise an investigation with a negotiated settlement to cover the tax evaded 
and the appropriate interest and penalty charge. For some offences the penalty charge may 
be mitigated by up to 50% to induce taxpayers to cooperate with investigations. Although 
Customs and Excise appear more willing than the Inland Revenue to prosecute, for example 
in 1986/87 there were 196 instances where the department resorted to criminal proceedings, 
it appears that even in serious cases a negotiated settlement is preferred to prosecution 
(Smith, 1986, p.60).’ 
Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Revenue Departments 
The changes in the organisation and the powers of the revenue departments detailed above 
had their origins in a desire to increase the cost effectiveness of investigation work. To 
those who can see merit in tax evasion, for example because they believe that a thriving 
black economy increases national production (eg. Weiss, 1976; Bracewell-Mimes, 1979, 
pp.68-70; ed. Seldon, 1979), any improved effectiveness of revenue investigations is at best a 
mixed blessing. But the approach adopted here is to equate improved cost/yield ratios and 
. 
other productivity measures with improved efficiency. The approach also ignores- both the 
important issues of the “excess burden” from taxation and the effect of compliance costs 
because of the difficulty in measuring them. A simple definition of the excess burden or 
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deadweight loss from taxation is given by Auerbach (1986, p.67): “The deadweight loss from 
a tax system is that amount that is lost in excess of what government collects”. It represents 
a net welfare loss. Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick (1989) have pointed to the large but 
mainly hidden costs imposed upon the private sector by having to comply with the tax 
system (eg. operating the PAYE system). 
The efficiency of revenue departments is usually measured by cost/yield ratios which equate 
the cost of collecting taxes to the amounts of tax recovered. Cost/yield ratios are given 
below but are supplemented with a number of other productivity and cost related indices. 
Annual figures are used to trace changes in operating efficiency over time and particularly 
since the major organisational changes referred to earlier. 
Cost/yield ratios have the advantage that they are relatively easy to calculate. However, 
they may be affected by changes in tax legislation which affect the costs of tax collection 
and by economic and demographic changes outside the control of the revenue departments 
(eg. the rise in the number of small businesses in the UK in the 1980s). They also tell us 
nothing about the accuracy and quality of the work performed. There has been much 
concern in the UK in recent years regarding the number of incorrect tax assessments issued 
and delays in answering postal enquiries from taxpayers. The other productivity measures 
which can be readily constructed also suffer from similar defects and this should be born in 
mind when interpreting the statistics below. 
Retaining confidence in the tax system is a major goal of revenue departments and catching 
evaders remains essential if the vast bulk of taxpayers are to continue to comply with tax 
legislation. Hence, although it is impossible to put a figure on the amount of tax defended 
by investigation work, figures of tax directly recovered from investigations no doubt greatly 
underestimate their full revenue impact. This is underlined by research in the Inland 
Revenue into income tax accounts which have been investigated. This research suggests 
improvements in income declared continuing for at least 5 years following an investigation. 
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This effectively doubles the yield from investigation settlements (Inland Revenue, 131st 
Annual Report, 1989). To this should be added the revenue gains from improved tax 
compliance by friends and business associates of the identified and penalised evader. 
Inland Revenue 
Table 5 provides details of the number of cases investigated each year by the Inland 
Revenue between 1 April 1971 and 31 October 1980, along with figures of tax raised and 
penalties and interest charged. Up until the mid-1970s there was only a negligible increase 
in the number of taxpayers investigated and allowing for inflation, the tax recovered was 
almost stagnant. It was this poor trend in the face of growing public concern about tax 
evasion that led to the introduction of the “ERA system”. . . 
(Table 5 around here.) 
Its introduction appears to have had the desired effect with the number of cases investigated 
almost doubling and with even greater gains in tax recovered. This marked improvement in 
performance also came at a time when the number of Inland Revenue inspectors changed 
very little. It seems that the more careful selection of potential investigation cases, which 
lies at the heart of the “ERA system”, produced the desired higher tax yield and without the 
Government having to put in significant new resources. 
The improved performance has continued through the 1980s as the figures in Table 6 
confirm. Even allowing for inflation, the total tax yield rose by 592.5% through the decade 
with big gains being posted by all sections of the Revenue but especially PAYE audit. 
Also, the new special units at head office have made an impressive start. Expressing this 
yield in terms of staff employed, in real terms productivity in investigation work rose by 
just over 319% or by almost 32% per annum. 
..(,. .,. ‘. . ..-“.’ .. ’ , 
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(Table 6 around here.) 
Narrowing the focus to the tax offices and Enquiry Branch only, it is evident that not only 
are more investigation cases being taken up but that the Inland Revenue is resorting more 
frequently to interest and penalties. Whereas in 1980 only 42% of investigations were 
settled with interest and penalties, in 1989 almost 69% were so settled. The figures in Table 
7 also reveal that the greater incidence of interest and penalty charges has grown gradually 
through the decade. 
Table 8 provides a breakdown of investigation work in tax offices, where the vast bulk of 
investigation work is centred. These categories are accounts and non-accounts 
investigations and Schedule D (self-employed) and Schedule E (employee) compliance work. 
All these areas of investigation work appear to have chalked up impressive results, especially 
at a time of falling staff numbers. But the Schedule D compliance results are particularly 
impressive. Compliance work involves ensuring that all those who should be paying income 
tax are paying and that the legislation is correctly applied. Throughout the Revenue this 
work has proven particularly cost effective with cost/yield ratios of between 1:15 for tax 
offices to 1:37 for Special Offices (Board of Inland Revenue, Z3Zst Annual Report, 1989). 
The impressive performance in Schedule D compliance follows the department’s efforts since 
1980 to crack down on moonlighters or “ghosts” by setting up specialist units within tax 
offices. 
(Tables 7 and 8 around here.) 
Cost/yield ratios for investigation work suggest that investigations are extremely cost 
effective. In the mid-1980s tax offices had a ratio of 1:6.8, Enquiry Branch 1:17.6, Special 
Offices 1:27 and PAYE audit 1:55. Also, in 1981 the Inland Revenue. reported that the 
gross incremental return from extra staff engaged in investigation worked out at around 
. . . . L- 
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diminishing returns. Such figures do not, however, take into account the cost of 
investigations in terms of time and expense imposed upon the private sector or any excess 
burden (Topham, 1984); nevertheless, they imply that more resources put into Inland 
Revenue investigation work would at least generate large net gains to the Exchequer. On 
the whole, these resources have not been forthcoming in the 1980s. 
The department’s attack on evasion has been constantly hampered by a lack of trained 
inspectors, reflecting the department’s more general difficulty in recruiting and retaining 
staff. There has been a large and continuous hemorrhaging of more highly qualified staff 
to the private sector where pay and conditions are perceived to be superior. In the year to 
31 March 1988 the number of inspectors of all grades who resigned reached a record, with 
6% of all fully trained inspectors leaving. One result of this and the Government’s efforts, 
especially between 1979 and 1982 to trim public sector employment, has been a reduction in 
the number of inspectors, from around 6000 in April 1978 to 5300 in April 1988. 
A lack of staff means that very few business accounts are challenged each year, a record 
which troubled the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee in the early 1980s. At the 
time only around 2.8% of non-company accounts and 0.9% of company accounts were being 
investigated each year, but in 87% of these cases understatements of profits were revealed. 
The Committee interpreted this as evidence that widescale evasion was going unchallenged. 
In response the Inland Revenue agreed to increase the percentage of accounts investigated 
but then singularly failed to do so. By 1987/88 the percentage had fallen to 2.2% for non- 
company accounts and 0.78% for company accounts. The department blames its failure on 
a continuing lack of qualified inspectors; something which is unlikely to be reversed until 
there is more political commitment in Government to tackling evasion, supported by the 
allocation of the necessary resources to pay inspectors competitive salaries. 
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Customs and Excise 
The Customs and Excise department has also recorded large gai 1s in productivity since the 
late 1970s. The number of staff directly employed on VAT work has risen only marginally 
since 1978, while the number of traders registered for VAT has increased by over 20%. 
The result has been a rise in the average number of traders each member of staff has to deal 
with (see Table 9). Nevertheless, the department has managed to increase the number of 
control visits, which form its main means of unearthing evasion, and this has led to a 378% 
increase in recoveries of tax underdeclared in real terms. The average under-declaration 
per control visit has similarly leaped by 335O/6. At the same time, the cost of administering 
VAT as a share of revenue raised has fallen by 4S”& In all respects the department’s record 
is impressive. 
(Table 9 around here.) 
The marked rise in the performance of the department could reflect a surge in VAT evasion 
in the 1980s. But as there is no evidence that VAT evasion is more widespread now than in 
the late 197Os, more likely it reflects the department’s greater success in tracking down 
evaders. Indeed, the introduction of new and more swingeing penalties for VAT 
irregularities from the mid-1980s should have had the desired effect of dissuading potential 
evaders. The department’s success appears to result from the organisational changes 
introduced since the 1970s and detailed earlier. In particular the department has targeted 
trades most prone to evasion for regular control visits and monitored the performance of 
VAT offices against targets, both to encourge local management and to better allocate the 
department’s scarce resources nationally. 
. 
Conclusion 
. The size of the black economy in the UK remains uncertain despite a number of attempts at 
mnn.~..rnmnn+ r;nrn tha late 197nc High estimates of 15% tend to make the headlines but 
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are likely to be flawed because they rely upon a method of calculation - cash transactions - 
which is highly suspect. Other methods produce estimates that the black economy is around 
5% of GNP, which is not dissimilar to the Inland Revenue’s own estimate of 7%. A lower 
level estimate implies that on an international scale, and especially compared to countries 
such as Italy, tax evasion is not a major problem in the UK. One possible explanation is 
the success of the UK revenue departments in combatting tax dodging. 
Both of the major departments of state responsible for tax assessment and collection in the 
UK - the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise - have undergone major reorganisations 
since the 1970s with a view to meeting public concern about the extent of tax evasion. In 
both cases there has been a noticeable move towards greater selectivity in choosing cases for 
investigation. This has led to a fall in the percentage of accounts and returns challenged 
and this in turn has led to criticism in Parliament, especially regarding the percentage of 
business and company accounts investigated by the Inland Revenue. But such worries may 
be misplaced. What is important is not the number of taxpayers challenged but the impact 
of investigations on the public’s propensity to evade. A growing theoretical literature on 
strategies for tax authorities suggests that the most efficient use of tax authority resources 
requires a differential probability of audit across individuals (Pyle, 1989, p.178). In the 
UK both departments have adopted this appr0ach.l’ 
A positive result of selectivity has been a significant growth in tax recovered. Both the 
Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise have become much more proficient since the mid- 
1970s at identifying those trades prone to evasion and so have become more successful in 
raising the tax yield from each investigation. These developments have been supported by 
a move towards relevant performance targets for staff appraisal and more local management 
accountability in both departments. The overall result has been improved productivity 
measured in terms of cost/yield figures and similar ratios. A further change has been the 
introduction of more extensive penalty powers, especially for Customs and Excise with 
consequently a noticeable improvement in compliance with VAT legislation. 
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The history of tax investigations in the UK since the 1970s seems to confirm that the 
organisation of tax authorities can have a marked effect on performance in terms of tracking 
down and penalising evaders and this is an important lesson for other countries. Another 
clear conclusion is that tax evasion is contained by maintaining the confidence of the bulk 
of taxpayers in the administration of the tax system. This requires constant effort by the 
tax authorities. The price of protecting the tax flow to the Exchequer is eternal vigilance. 
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Footnotes 
1. Kay remarks: “It is apparent that there are large differences between countries in the 
effectiveness of their tax administration, although I know of no attempt to quantify the 
issue.” (Kay, 1990, p.62) This chapter does not attempt to quantify differences but it is 
designed to shed light on the effectiveness of one body of tax authorities, those in the UK. 
2. The bulk of national insurance contributions, those paid by employees, are collected by 
the Inland Revenue through the Pay as You Earn (PAYE) system and then paid over to the 
Department of Social Security. Under the PAYE system income tax and national insurance 
contributions are deducted by the employer upon payment of wages and salaries. The 
employer then pays over the tax and national insurance to the Collector of Taxes by the 15th 
day of the following month. 
3. For historical reasons which appear to have their origins in a desire to minimise the risk 
. of corruption of officials, the Revenue is divided into two broad parts below Board level. 
Tax assessment including the identification of evaders is undertaken by the Inspectorate. 
- 
Collection of tax assessed is the responsibility of the Collector of Taxes branch. 
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4. Under the subcontractor scheme for the building and construction industry, all 
subcontracto,rs without a special exemption certificate awarded by their local tax office 
(known as a 714) must be paid by contractors net of income tax at the basic rate, currently 
25%. This system was introduced in the 1970s to combat widespread evasion of tax within 
the industry by self employed subcontractors who failed to file accounts with the tax 
authorities. 
5. Alongside the lack of selectivity in instituting enquiries, a contributory factor to the 
decline in the yield from investigations was the increase in the administrative workload of 
the department due to legislative changes, especially the introduction of Corporation Tax and 
Capital Gains Tax in 1965. 
6. There is then a further right of appeal on a point of law to the High Court, Court of 
Appeal and finally the House of Lords. 
7. In 1989 it was decided that those with gross business earnings from self employment or 
the letting of property of less than f 10,000 per annum need not submit detailed accounts. 
8. The Committee favoured fixed penalties for tax offences but this was rejected by the 
Inland Revenue. The department ‘preferred to retain some flexibility in setting penalties to 
encourage taxpayer co-operation with their enquiries (Inland Revenue, 1986). 
9. In addition to the above penalties, there are also penalties for accountants who connive in 
tax evasion; plus non-mitigable penalties for failing to make returns of PAYE tax and of 
national insurance contributions are being phased in by 1995 (Newth, 1989). Also, a “pay 
and file” system for Corporation Tax will be introduced in January 1993. ‘Under this 
system the onus will be on companies to submit accounts within the normal time period (9 
months of the end of their accounting period), or to estimate their profits by that date. 
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Automatic penalties will be imposed for late returns and interest will be charged on tax paid 
late. This system may in time be extended to income tax if the experiment is successful. 
10. The reluctance of the revenue departments to prosecute for fraud contrasts vividly with 
the attitude taken by another government department, the Department of Social Security, to 
those believed to have falsely claimed social security benefits. Not only are those found 
guilty of social security abuse around 20 times more likely to be taken to court, the 
Department of Social Security has received considerably more resources in the 1980s to 
tackle abuse despite their investigations having a cost/yield ratio of only 1:3. This is far 
inferior to the cost/yield ratios of the revenue departments (Cook, 1989, p.117). 
11. The intensity of auditing by the tax authorities is itself an independent variable on 
which the authorities must make a decision (Dardanoni and Marrelli, 1988). 
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FIGURE 2 
A Tvmical Tax Office 
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RE = Revenue Executive (prior to 1988 called Tax Officers’ Higher Grade) 
RO = Revenue Officer @rior to 1988 called Tax Officers) 
RA= Revenue Ass&ant @rior to 1988 called Clerical Assistants) 
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FIGURE 3 
Offence 
INLAND REVENUE: PENALTIES FOR EVASION 
Failure to make a return of income and 
gains 
Late return of income and gains (after 
one year following the normal year of 
assessment) 
Incorrect annual tax returns and tax 
accounts 
Failure to make other returns and to 
supply other information 
Fraudulent or negligent supply of other 
returns or information 
Penalty 
Initial penalty of f300 followed by f60 
per day 
100% of tax assessed late 
100% of tax underdeclared 
Initial penalty f300 followed by f60 per 
day 
f 3000 
Notes: 
This is an overview of the main provisions only. All penalties are mitigable 
depending upon the degree of taxpayer cooperation, disclosure by the 
taxpayer and the size and gravity of the offence (amount of tax at risk). 
In all cases, default interest (Section 88, Taxes Management Act, 1970) is 
levied from the time the tax should have been paid to the time it is paid. 
The interest rate reflects market rates and the charge is rarely mitigated. 
FIGURE 4 
Organisation of 
Customs and Excise 
at 31 March 1989 
. . 
Chairman 
(Accounting Officer) 
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Deputy Chairman 
and Director General 
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(Principal Establishmenr 
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and Director General 
Internal Taxation and 
Customs Group 
(Commissioner) I 
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Training Services 
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Press and Informatic c I 
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1 Revenue Duties Director Divisions 
- Internal Taxes - ’ 
(Commissioner) - VAT Administratia 
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VAT International f 
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FIG U R E  5  
T A B L E  
V A T  P E N A L T IE S  
( o p e r a tive  o n  or  b e fo r e  1  Janua ry  1 9 9 0 )  
O ffe n c e  
L a te  V A T  re turns 
Se r i ous  m isdec lara t ion  
( fa i lure to  dec la re  l iabi l i ty 
o r  u n d e r s ta tin g  n e t V A T  d u e )  
Pers is tent  m isdec lara t ion  
- pers is tent  u n d e r s ta te m e n t 
o f V A T  l iabi l i ty in  th e  V A T  
re turn  
L a te  reg is t ra t ion a n d  
u n a u tho r i sed  i ssue  o f V A T  
i nvo ices  
Cr im ina l  f raud:  evas ion  o f 
V A T  invo lv ing  d ishones ty  
“b e y o n d  r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t 
P e n a l ty 
“D e faul t  su rcha rge” 
Tax  re la ted  p e n a l ties,  
5 - 3 0 %  o f tax  p a i d  la te 
- l i nked  to  n u m b e r  o f la te 
re turns  
3 0 %  o f th e  tax  wh i ch  w o u l d  
h a v e  b e e n  lost (sub ject  to  
cer ta in  cond i t ions)  
1 5 %  o f tax  lost fo l l ow ing  
inaccuracy  in  th e  th i rd  a n d  
later  V A T  re turns  wi th in  a  
set  tim e  pe r i od  
1 0 %  to 3 0 %  o f tax  lost 
Im p r i s o n m e n t u p  to  7  
years  a n d  un l im i ted  fin e s  
o n  conv ic t ion  by  a n  
ind ic tment  in  th e  C r o w n  
C o u r t, o r  i m p r i s o n m e n t 
fo r  u p  to  1 2  m o n ths  a n d  
fin e s  u p  to  3  tim e s  
th e  tax  u n d e r d e c l a r e d  o n  
s u m m a r y  conv ic t ion  in  
th e  M a g i s trates C o u r t. 
Civ i l  f raud:  evas ion  o f V A T  U p  to  1 0 0 %  o f tax  e v a d e d , 
invo lv ing  d ishones ty  o n  a  r e d u c e d  by  u p  to  5 0 %  fo r  
“b a l a n c e  o f probab i l i t ies”. taxpaye r  c o o p e r a tio n  
B reaches  o f regu ia to ry  
p rov is ions  e g  rega rd ing  
re tent ion  o f V A T  records  
Var ious ,  d e p e n d i n g  u p o n  
o ffe n c e  e g  fa i lu re  to  keep  V A T  records  
fo r  6  years  - m a x i m u m  p e n a l ty f5 0 0 . 
N o te : T h e  p e n a l ty p rov is ions  fo r  V A T  evas ion  a n d  b r e a c h  o f V A T  regu la t ions  a re  
comp lex .  T h e  a b o v e  p rov ides  a n  ove rv iew o f th e  m a i n  p rov is ions  only .  
Cer ta in  p e n a l ties  m a y  b e  m i t igated fo r  c o o p e r a tio n . - 
In terest  is a l so  c h a r g e a b l e  o n  tax  e v a d e d  o r  p a i d  late. 
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Table 2: 
Numbers of Staff per Tax Office (averages) 
Tax Officers 
Higher Grade 
Tax officers 
Clerical Assistant 
Others 
Inspectors 
Total 
April 1978 April 1989 
13.0 Revenue Executive 14.3 
13.4 Revenue officer 21.3 
20.8 Revenue Assistant 15.2 
n/a Others 5.4 
7.8 Inspectors 8.4 
65.0 Total 64.6 
Source: Inland Revenue Compliance and Collection Division. 
Table 3: 
Inland Revenue: Number of Staff in Post at 31 March each year 
Year Number 
1950* 49,579 
1960* 56,042 
1970 68,632 
1977 83,885 
1978 85,175 
1979 84,645 
1980 78,312 
1981 75,624 
1982 73,976 
1983 73,110 
1984 69,832 
1985 69,770 
1986 69,260 
1987 67,798 
1988 66,612 
1989 67,046 
Note: 
* includes casual staff not identified separately before 1967. 
Source: Board of Inland Revenue, Annual Reports, various years. 
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TABLE 5 
Inland Revenue: Analysis of Investigation Cases 
involving interest and penalties 
Year to: No.of cases Total tax 
investigated raised 
Penalties 
levied 
(f ‘000) 
Interest charges 
levied 
(f ‘000) 
31.3.72 11,069 13,282 1,968 2,332 
31.3.73 11,792 15,431 2,943 2,355 
31.3.74 11,787 16,111 3,111 2,341 
31.3.75 11,707 17,29 1 3,365 2,541 
31.3.76 12,702 23,226 4,467 3,761 
il. 10.76 
------...--. - --_- -____ ______ ‘1 
13,561 22,823 3,793 3,488 
31.10.77 15,626 37,297 6,100 7,362 
31.10.78 18,521 46,815 9,106 9,909 
31.10.79 21,298 63,312 11,720 13,760 
31.10.80 22,465 78,890 2 14,732 17,539 
Source: Board of Inland Revenue, Annual Repons, various years 
1. Reporting date changes 
2. In real terms the total tax raised almost doubled between 1975 and 1980. 
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